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IS THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES DOOMED? 
THE "WAIT AND SEE" DocTRINE 
Lewis M. Simes* 
FEW rules of the common law have shown such amazing vitality as the rule against perpetuities. Emerging in the Duke of Norfolk's 
Case1 in 1682, as a rule to restrict unbarrable entails in land, it is now 
applied, not only to interests in land, legal and equitable, but also to 
personal estate, tangible and intangible, including beneficial interests 
in trusts. It is regarded as a part of the common law of nearly every 
English speaking country, except a few of the United States where 
statutory substitutes have been provided. Since 1930, statutory substi-
tutes have been abolished and there has been a return to the common 
law rule by legislative enactment in six states.2 
In spite of this pronounced legislative trend, it is possible to detect 
the stirrings of a counter current. The rule has recently been personi-
fied as "an elderly female clothed in the dress of a bygone period who 
obtrudes her personality into current affairs with bursts of indecorous 
energy," and who "must learn to sit by the fire and confine her activity 
to a few words of wise advice from time to tirne."3 Moreover, since the 
decision in the case of Brown -v. Independent Baptist Church of 
Woburn,4 in 1950, the distinction between executory devises and 
"" Floyd Russell Mechem University Professor of Law and Director of Legal Research, 
University of Michigan.-Ed. 
l 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931. 
2Afa. Gen. Acts (1931) No. 684; Cal. Stat. (1951) c. 1463; 114 Ohio Laws (1931) 
p. 470; Indiana Laws (1945) c. 216; Mich. Public Acts (1949) No. 38; Wyoming Laws 
(1949) c. 92. 
s Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. 
L. REv. 721 at 725 and 727 (1952). 
4 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. (2d) 922. This case involved a devise of land to a church 
"to be holden and enjoyed by them so long as they shall continue as a church;" and if the 
church be dissolved then the land was to go to certain named persons. A later clause in 
the will devised the residue of the estate to the same named persons. The court determined 
that the first devise to the named persons was an executory interest, void under the rule 
against perpetuities; but this left a possibility of reverter in the testatrix's estate, which was 
validly devised by the residuary clause. Of course, under orthodox doctrines, the residuary 
clause created a void executory interest as well as the prior gift over. For it was created 
by the same instrument by which the determinable fee was created. The testatrix did not 
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possibilities of reverter would seem to have become so completely oblit-
erated in . Massachusetts as to permit the exact equivalent of a legal 
executory interest to be created in any living person who might be 
selected, without being subjected to the restrictive operation of the rule 
against perpetuities. 
I 
THE 'WAIT AND SEE" DocTRINB 
The most serious aspect of this counter trend, however, remains to 
be described. To use the apt phrase of its chief proponent, it is the 
"wait and see" doctrine. It means that the validity of contingent future 
interests under the rule against perpetuities is to be determined as of 
the time when the contingency occurs. 
Before entering upon a discussion of that doctrine, a brief statement 
of the existing common law rule5 on this matter should be made. First, 
let us recall Gray's shorthand statement of the rule, which is as follows: 
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."6 In 
applying this rule, the validity of a future interest is, with one excep-
tion, determined by considering the facts as they exist at the time the 
period of the rule begins to run, this time commonly being the delivery 
of the deed or the death of the testator. The one exception arises when 
an appointment under a general power to appoint by will only, or under 
a special power, is involved. In those cases, though the period is 
counted from the creation of the power, the validity of the appointment 
is determined by a consideration of facts as they exist at the time when 
the power is exercised. 7 
:first create a determinable fee and then devise it, for she did not die twice. See 2 PnoP· 
ERTY RESTATEMENT §§154 and 158 (1936). Since, unfortunately, the possibility of 
reverter is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, this decision permits a testator, by 
placing a gift in the residuary clause, to make_ it a possibility of reverter and thus exempt 
it from the rule against perpetuities. 
It is true, in any jurisdiction in which possibilities of reverter are alienable, a person 
can create a determinable fee by one conveyance and assign the possibility of reverter, which 
he thereby reserves to himself, in a later conveyance. That is because one can make two 
conveyances, taking effect at different times, and he, therefore, can first create a possibility 
of reverter and later assign it. This is bad enough, but the recent Massachusetts decision 
extends the evil to testamentary transactions. 
5 By the existing common law rule is meant the rule in jurisdictions other than Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire. The law of these states is later discussed. 
6 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., 191 (1942). 
7 See, for example, Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 A. 396 (1936). 
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A. Sources of the Doctrine 
Early in 1952, Professor W. Barton Leach, of the Harvard Law 
School, published two substantially identical articles, one in the Har-
vard Law Review8 and one in the Law Quarterly Review,° in which 
he advocated legislation modifying the common law rule against per-
petuities so that the validity of a contingent interest would be deter-
mined in the light of events existing when the contingency occurred. 
''Whatever reason may be adduced through either ancient authority 
or present contrivance," he says, "I am certain that the better reason 
is opposed to the current doctrine. By hypothesis the interests in ques-
tion are all contingent .... Why should we not 'wait and see' to deter-
mine whether the contingency happens within the period of the 
Rule?"10 
Later in 1952, when the American Law of Property came off the 
press, similar views were expressed in Part XXIV, written by Professor 
Leach and Mr. Owen Tudor, of the Boston bar. These views are 
indicated by the following excerpt:11 "The reason, if any, for the rule 
that, in case of a devise or bequest, the courts will not 'wait and see' 
whether events actually turn out in such a way as to cause all interests 
to vest within the period of perpetuities is this: As soon as an interest 
is created its validity should be capable of ascertainment. The present 
writers do not consider this an adequate reason-by hypothesis the 
remainder is contingent, so all the parties must 'wait and see' which way 
the contingencies happen; why is there any inconvenience in requiring 
them to 'wait and see' whether the contingencies happen within the 
period of the Rule?" 
A few months after the publication of the American Law of Prop-
erty, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts handed down its 
decision in the case of Sears v. Coolidge.12 The facts were substan-
tially as follows: The settlor of an inter vivos trust had reserved to 
himself a power to amend and declare new uses in any manner except 
8 "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HAnv. L. 
fuv. 721 (1952). 
9 "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents," 68 L.Q. fuv. 35 (1952). 
10 65 HAnv. L. fuv. 721 at 730 (1952). Similar language appears in 68 L.Q. fuv. 
35 at 44 (1952). In each article legislative changes in the rule are suggested for consid-
eration, the fust of which is "a provision that the rule will be applied to any interest on 
the basis of events which have actually occurred at the termination of the preceding 
interests, not on the basis of events which might have occurred but did not." 65 HARV. L. 
fuv. 721 at 747 (1952). 
116 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 102 (1952). While the passage quoted purports 
to state the view of "the writers," note 7, page 102, and note 4a, page 104, indicate that 
Mr. Tudor does not entirely agree with Professor Leach's "wait and see" doctrine. 
12 108 N.E. (2d) 563 (1952). 
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for his own benefit. This power is treated, for purposes of the case, as 
a special power of appointment. Subject to the power, and qualified 
by an alternative contingency which did not occur, the corpus of the 
trust was to be distributed to the settlor' s issue living at the time of 
distribution, which was fixed at the time when the settlor' s youngest 
grandchild living at his death should attain the age of fifty. The young-
est grandchild who attained the age of fifty was in being when the 
trust was created, and no grandchildren were born after the trust was 
set up. The power was not exercised. The court held that the provi-
sion for distribution was valid under the rule against perpetuities. Cit-
ing the American Law of Property,13 from which quotation has herein 
been made, the court reasoned that, since the facts existing when a 
special power of appointment is exercised may be considered in deter-
mining the validity of the appointment, it should also be possible, in 
determining the validity of a gift in default, to consider facts existing 
when the donee dies and the power is unexercised. 
This, of course, is a long way from accepting the "wait and see" 
doctrine in its entirety, and would seem merely to extend the doctrine 
to a gift in default of appointment. Moreover, the case could have 
been decided on a perfectly orthodox ground which the court referred 
to but did not rely on. At the time the trust was created, the settlor was 
eighty-one years old and a widower. His only children then living 
were two daughters, one aged fifty-nine years and the other fifty-five 
years. It could fairly, therefore, be assumed that, when the settlor 
referred to "the attainment of fifty by the youngest surviving grandchild 
of mine who was living at my death," he meant "youngest grandchild 
of those living when the trust was set up," because he did not anticipate 
that he would have any more grandchildren.14 
In Merchants Nat. Bank v. Curtis,15 the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court passed upon the validity of a gift over in a testamentary trust 
limited to vest "if my granddaughter M.M.C. or other grandchildren 
shall survive both my children and shall have and leave no heirs of her 
or their body." M.M.C. was the only granddaughter which the tes-
tatrix had. She died without leaving any surviving issue. The court 
held the gift over valid under the rule. First, the court gave the per-
fectly orthodox reason that there were really two alternative contingen-
cies, namely, the death of M.M.C. without surviving issue, and the 
13 The court cited 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.36 (1952), which is concerned 
with the single question whether, in determining the validity of a gift in default, facts 
existing when the donee died may be considered. 
14 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §377, comment c (1944). 
15 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953). 
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death of unborn grandchildren without surviving issue. The first was 
clearly valid in its inception under the rule, since M.M.C. was the life 
in being. Since this is the contingency which occurred, the gift over 
was good.16 But the court went on to say that the 'condition might be 
construed as a single contingency, in which case the facts could be 
considered as of the time when the testatrix' s children died. The 
American Law of Property and Professor Leach's Harvard Law Review 
article, which have already been referred to, were cited with approval, 
the court observing: "When a decision is made at a time when the 
events have happened, the court should not be compelled to consider 
only what might have been and completely ignore what was." 
In addition to these two cases we have one statute which definitely 
lays down the "wait and see" doctrine. In 1947, as a part of its new 
Estates Act, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the following pro-
vision:17 
"Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common 
law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than 
possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in 
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to 
increase shall be void." 
Apparently it was not realized how revolutionary this piece of leg-
islation is. The comment in the report of the Joint State Government 
Commission, in which the statute is presented to the legislature, states, 
"This subsection is intended to disturb the common law rule as little 
as possible .... "18 A justification for the new provision is that, accord-
ing to Pennsylvania law, it appears that the courts will not construe 
a will for the purpose of determining the validity of contingent equi-
table interests in a trust until after the death of the life tenant.19 To 
date the Pennsylvania courts have not construed this statute. 
Thus we have in support of the existence of a "wait and see" doc-
trine two cases, each of which could be decided on other and perfectly 
orthodox grounds, and an uninterpreted statute.19a Evidently we cannot 
16 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §376 (1944). 
17 1 Pennsylvania Laws (1947) No. 39, §4(b). 
18 Report of the Joint State Government Commission of the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania Relating to the Following Decedents' Estates Laws: Intestate Act of 1947; 
Wills Act of 1947; Estates Act of 1947; Principal and Income Act of 1947, p. 72 (1947). 
19 See Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938), cited to this effect in the 
Report referred to in note 18 supra. In general on declaratory judgments in Pennsylvania, 
see the monograph on that subject by Professor Levin, published in Purdon's Pennsylvania 
Statutes Annotated (1953), immediately preceding title 12, §731. Of course, what the 
Pennsylvania legislature did was to perpetuate a bad rule as to the time when the validity 
of a future interest can be determined. 
19a See Addendum, infra p. 194.-Ed. 
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be sure that the doctrine is iJ force anywhere except in Pennsylvania, 
and we still do not know precisely what it means there. But before this 
innovation spreads further, it may be well to consider what it means 
and where it is likely to lead us. 
B. The Case against the 'Wait and See" Doctrine 
It is my belief that the "wait and see" doctrine, in the unqualified 
form presented in the Pennsylvania statute and elsewhere,2° is unde-
sirable and unworkable; and that its adoption means that the rule 
against perpetuities is doomed. 
I. Since a contingent future interest exists when the creating 
instrument takes effect, its validity should be determined as of that time. 
Protagonists of the "wait and see" doctrine appear to find something 
startling about determining the validity of an interest in accordance 
with facts existing when it is created. It would seem that to consider 
validity as of the time when interests arise is a completely normal proc-
ess which runs all through our legal system. The validity of a devise 
on a condition in restraint of marriage is not determined when the 
devisee marries. Suppose, for example, a testator devises his estate to 
his two-year-old daughter on a condition subsequent that she never 
marry. We do not wait until she is old enough to be legally capable of 
marriage before determining whether the condition is illegal. We 
det<;rmine it at the death of the testator. Contracts are determined to 
be against public policy when they are executed, not when one of the 
parties does something against public policy. 
A good deal has been said, both in prose and poetry, about the 
validity of limitations under the rule against perpetuities being deter-
mined on the basis of what "might have been." It is submitted that all 
20 For comments on the Pennsylvania statute, see the following: Bregy, "A Defense of 
Pennsylvania's Statutes on Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 313 (1950); Phipps, "The 
Pennsylvania fu"Periment in Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 20 (1949); notes, 60 HARv. 
L. REv. 1174 (1947); 23 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. 511 (1948); 97 Umv. PA. L. REv. 263 
(1948); 26 TEMPLE L.Q, 148 (1952). 
In general, on the "wait and see" doctrine, in addition to the Leach articles cited, 
notes 8 and 9 supra, see the following: 6 AMErucAN LAw OF PROPERTY 40, 99-106 
(1952); Newhall, "Doctrine of the 'Second Look'," 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 13 (1953); 
"Reform of the-Rule Against Perpetuities,'' Panel Discussion by Looker, Leach, Simes and 
Newhall, 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 768 (1953), same in A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS, PROBATE 
AND TRUST LAw DIVISIONS 83 (1953). 
It should be pointed out that, in the panel discussion last cited, Professor Leach merely 
advocated determining the facts as they exist at the termination of the life estate in apply-
ing the rule against perpetuities. Since, however, he did not indicate any retraction from 
the position taken in earlier writings, it is to be assumed that his proposal made at the 
A.B.A. meeting represented what he believed a legislature might be willing to enact. 
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the rule against perpetuities does is to look at facts as they are when 
the testator dies or when the deed is delivered. In a number of juris-
dictions interested parties may be able to have the validity of future 
interests determined immediately upon the inception of the instru-
ment.21 Ideally, in such jurisdictions, the suit to determine the validity 
of the future interest would be brought at the moment of the inception 
of the interest. If that were true, then the decision would never be 
made on the basis of facts which "might have been." But since in 
practice there will be a period of time between the inception of the 
instrument and the filing of the suit, it sometimes could happen that 
there would be a decision on the basis of facts which had not and could 
not occur. However, no one, whether he favors the "wait and see" 
doctrine or not, would contend that the facts should be determined as 
of the time suit is filed, since that would give the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity, by careful timing, to determine the validity of the future 
interest. 
It is true, in some jurisdictions, when a trust involves an equitable 
life estate with future interests following it, the courts refuse to deter-
mine the validity of the future interests until the life estate ends. But 
that rule has nothing to do with the rule against perpetuities and is 
inconsistent with the modem trend of enlightened jurisprudence. Cer-
tainly the existence of a bad rule such as that should not cause us to 
change the rule against perpetuities. 
There was a time when a person in whose favor a contingent 
future interest was limited was thought of as having little more than 
a bare expectance like the spes successionis of the heir apparent. He 
had no remedies to protect his interest before it vested; he could not 
assign it; for practical purposes it did not exist until it vested. But 
today, if modem trends in the law of future interests mean anything, 
they mean that future interests are existing interests and can be owned 
just as certainly as possessory fees simple in land.22 
The practical effect of the "wait and see" doctrine in this respect 
may be illustrated by the following case. A transfers securities to T 
on trust to pay the income to B for his life, and to hold until B has a 
son who has attained the age of fifty years, and then to transfer the 
corpus to such son; in default of any such son, then to transfer the 
corpus to C. Bis alive and has a son, D, twenty-one years of age, who 
is in excellent health. T, the trustee, is attempting to embezzle the trust 
21 See 2 ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JunG:MENTs, 2d ed., §576 (1951). 
22 See 2 PROPERTY REsTAT!ll\1llNT §153 (1936), where a future interest is described 
as a "segment of ownership." 
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estate in collusion with B. Under existing legal doctrines, the limita-
tions both to the son of B and to C are void under the rule against 
perpetuities. There would be a resulting trust in favor of A, who 
would be able to proceed against the trustee. But suppose we apply 
the "wait and see" doctrine. It would seem that neither C nor D could 
proceed against T.23 For when each brings his suit, the court will say: 
We cannot do anything for you, for your interest may be void ab initio 
under the rule against perpetuities; we must "wait and see." Nor is it 
clear that A can sue on any theory of resulting trust. For at the present 
time, D's interest may be valid, or C's interest may be valid. While 
technically it is possible to say that there is a resulting trust even if that 
be true, the interest of A would be so slight and ephemeral that equity 
might well refuse any remedy. 
If a contingent future interest exists for any purpose at the incep-
tion of the creating instrument, its validity should be determined as of 
that time. The reason why we consider the validity of an appointment 
in the light of facts existing when it is made is that the future interest 
is then created.24 But to say that the validity of a future interest, 
involving a right to present protection and a present power to alienate, 
cannot now be determined, involves both a logical and a practical 
anomaly. 
2. This doctrine leaves us without any satisfactory method of 
determining who are the lives in being.25 How do we determine the 
lives in being under the existing rule? The answer is, we may use any 
life as the measure, provided we can say, at the time the instrument 
takes effect, that, no matter what happens, the contingent interest will 
not vest later than twenty-one years after the termination of that life. 
As Professor Leach has said: "The measuring lives need not be men-
tioned in the instrument, need not be holders of previous estates and 
need not be connected in any way ·with the property or the persons 
designated to take it."26 
23 It may be argued that it is better to deny an action to C and D than to hold their 
interests void, as would be done under the common law rule. In answer it may be said 
that it is better to give a resulting interest to the settlor than to allow the trustee to 
embezzle the fund. 
24 It might also be said that the gift in default is not effectually created until it is 
certain that the power will not be exercised and that the non--exercise of the power is a kind 
of appointment to the taker in default. This would justify the result in Sears v. Coolidge, 
(Mass. 1952) 108 N.E. (2d) 563. 
25 This argument applies only if the facts are considered as of the time when the 
future interest vests. If any point of time prior to the happening of the contingency, such 
as the termination of a present life estate, or the exercise of a special power of appointment 
is selected, there is no difficulty in determining who are the lives in being. 
26 Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 at 641 (1938). 
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Suppose a testator devises his estate on trust to distribute to such of 
his lineal descendants as are alive twenty-two years after his death. If 
we look at this as of the testator's death, there is no life in being that 
can be used as the measure and the interest is void. For no matter 
whom we select, it is possible that the person may die within less than 
a year after the testator's death. On the other hand, if we apply the 
"wait and see" doctrine, we can use the life of any person who was 
alive at the testator's death and who lived for at least one year there-
after. The fact that there will likely be millions of people who come 
within that description should not invalidate the provisions. It is true, 
there is a rule to the effect that the measuring lives must not be so 
numerous that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably 
difficult to obtain.27 But that refers to cases where the interest is to 
vest on the death of the last survivor of several persons, such as a 
bequest to the last survivor of all persons whose names appear in the 
New York City telephone directory. In the case of a bequest to vest 
twenty-two years after the testator's death, we need £.nd only one life 
under the "wait and see" doctrine, and that will probably be quite easy. 
Perhaps it may be queried: Then why is not the "wait and see" 
doctrine desirable for that very reason? My answer is, if you can apply 
it in that case you can also apply it in a case where there is a devise 
to such of the testator's lineal descendants as are alive 120 years after 
the testator's death. If a person can be found who was alive when the 
testator died and who lived more than ninety-nine years after the time 
of the testator's death, the limitation would be good. One can imagine, 
in such a case, remote lineal descendants patiently awaiting the termi-
nation of the 120 year period, not knowing after all this time whether 
the limitation is good or bad. And £.nally, at the end of the 120th year, 
the attorney for the descendants advertises for evidence concerning 
any person who died twenty years ago and who was at least one hun-
dred years old at the time of his death. Doubtless the attorney will 
eventually £.nd such a person. For in every year there must be at least 
a few persons who die at the age of one hundred. But what a fantastic 
way to determine the_ validity of a future interest! 
A still more difficult case to solve, if the "wait and see" doctrine 
is to be applied, is the following: A devises Blackacre "to the B Church 
in fee simple; but if the land should ever cease to be used for church 
purposes, then to C in fee simple." How long do we wait to see 
whether that contingent future interest violates the rule against per-
27 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §374 and comment l to that section (1944). 
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petuities? Do we wait 120 years? or 130 years? Or must the church 
·actually cease to do business before we can decide whether the execu-
tory interest is void? 
3. The "wait and see" doctrine is a long step in the direction of 
inalienability of property. First, it seems clear, from the discussion 
which has preceded, that if the lives are selected at the end rather than 
at the beginning, longer lives will likely be chosen. The draftsman 
who selects twelve healthy babies at the inception of the future interest 
for the measuring lives may find that they all die within six months. 
But if he could select the lives when the contingency happens, he 
could never fail to find long ones. On this matter, hindsight is inevi-
tably better than foresight. 
Moreover, the fact that the future interest is not determined to be 
either good or bad until the contingency happens means that in many 
instances property would be inalienable for quite a long time in cases 
where, by the application of the common law rule, it would not be ren-
dered inalienable even for a day. This objection is particularly serious 
in cases involving legal titles to land. While, of course, the vast major-
ity of future interests about which litigation arises are equitable inter-
ests in trusts, an examination of the reports shows that problems in-
volving contingent legal interests in land are not negligible. 
It may also be pointed out that the proponents of the "wait and 
see" doctrine appear to be thinking solely in terms of problems involved 
in family trusts, and not from the standpoint of a land title attorney. I 
venture to assert that, if the "wait and see" doctrine were presented to 
any of the leading land title organizations of this country, its repudia-
tion would be practically unanimous. 
Consider again the fact situation already referred to. A devises 
Blackacre "to the B Church in fee simple; but if the land should ever 
cease to be used for church purposes, then to C in fee simple." At 
common law the executory interest limited to C is void, and B church 
at once has a fee simple absolute. According to the "wait and see" 
doctrine, we would have to wait until the condition happens before 
knowing whether the title of the church is good. Suppose after 125 
years, the church ceases to function, and after diligent search, no meas-
uring life can be found. Then the court decides that the church had 
a good title all the time. We have thus tied up the title for 125 years 
where it would not have been tied up at all at common law; and we 
have done so without carrying out the testator's wishes one whit more 
than the common law. 
Not only does the "wait and see" doctrine increase inalienability 
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by postponing a decision when future interests are involved; it can also 
postpone a decision when present interests are involved. There is a 
doctrine which has aptly been termed the doctrine of infectious inva-
lidity. 28 It is to the effect that, even though an interest devised may 
be perfectly valid in itself, if it is so closely connected with a future 
interest which fails under the rule against perpetuities that the testator 
would have preferred to die intestate rather than to have the future 
interest alone held invalid, then the present as well as the future interest 
fails. 
Suppose a testator has an estate of $300,000 and has three principal 
objects of his bounty, his children A, Band C, who are his only heirs. 
He bequeaths $100,000 to A. He bequeaths $100,000 to a trustee 
on trust to pay the income to B for life, and to transfer the corpus after 
his death to such of his children as attain the age of thirty years. He, 
also, makes the same sort of bequest of $100,000 on trust to pay the 
income to C for his life, and to transfer the corpus after his death to 
such of his children as attain the age of thirty years. Under the cominon 
law rule, the remainder interests limited to B's children and to C's 
children would be void. It is entirely possible, also, under the doctrine 
of infectious invalidity, a court might hold the life estates in B and C 
and the bequest to A void.29 This is because the testator intended a 
substantially equal distribution among his children, and this would be 
more nearly secured by holding that he died intestate as to all his estate. 
Under the "wait and see" doctrine, however, no question of invalidity 
could be determined until B and C die. Thus we would be in the 
absurd position of saying that the validity of the life estates could not 
be determined until the life estates had expired, and that the validity 
of the present absolute bequest of $100,000 could not be determined 
until the same time. 
I realize that it may be argued that in none of the cases I have put 
is the property tied up more than lives in being and twenty-one years 
under the "wait and see" doctrine, and that the present law permits a 
tying up for that period of time. But, there is no principle in the law 
that it is good public policy to tie up property for lives in being and 
twenty-one years. It is not good public policy to tie up property even 
for a day. But it is good public policy to allow people to do what they 
wish with their own property. The law strikes a rough balance be-
28 6 AMEmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§24.48 to 24.52 (1952); 4 PROPERTY RllsTATE-
MllNT §402 (1944). 
29 See In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938); Millikin National 
Bank of Decatur v. Wilson, 343 lli. 55, 174 N.E. 857 (1931). 
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tween these two conflicting policies, and the rule against perpetuities 
is the result. By the "wait and see" doctrine the balance is pushed 
farther in the direction of inalienability. Moreover, to tie up property 
for the period of the rule, and then eventually to prohibit a testator 
from doing what he wishes with his own property after all, would seem 
to be backed by no public policy whatsoever. 
C. Conclusions 
If the "wait and see" doctrine is generally adopted, in my opinion 
the common law rule against perpetuities, in anything like the form in 
which we know it, will cease to exist. If the doctrine is accepted in an 
unqulified form, the rule will have little restrictive effect. Property 
will be tied up more frequently and for longer periods. . 
On the other hand, if the doctrine is adopted at all, I think it more 
likely that its operation will be restricted and a new method of deter-
mining lives in being will slowly be evolved. Thus, an attempt may 
be made to limit the lives in being to those named or implied in the 
creating instrument. That, however, would seem to be a vague and 
unsatisfactory solution. As Lord Chief Baron Macdonald said in 
Thellusson v. Woodford,30 the first great case in which it was deter-
mined that the lives in being need not be persons who take under the 
creating instrument, "The length of time will not be greater or less ... 
whether the lives are those of persons immediately connected with, or 
immediately leading to that person in whom the property is first to vest: 
terms to which it is difficult to annex any precise meaning." (Italics 
are the author's.) If the courts do work out a new method of ascer-
taining the lives in being, it may mean years of uncertainty and costly 
litigation; and when the law is settled, it will not be the rule against 
perpetuities. 
II 
PUBLIC POLICY BACK OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES31 
Doubtless there are those who feel that, even if my dire predictions 
prove true and the rule against perpetuities vanishes, it will be no great 
loss. It can be contended that the policy of the rule is to prevent inalien-
ability of specific property, and that this policy js rarely violated by 
future interests which are created today. For most future interests are 
30 11 Ves. 112 at 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 at 1040 (1805). 
31 For a discussion of the rationale of the rule against perpetuities, see 4 Pnol'BRTY 
RBsTATBMBNT 2129 (1944). 
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equitable interests in trusts, and the trustee has a power to alienate the 
subject matter of the trust. Or if the contingent interest in question is 
a legal interest in a specific thing, ·such legislation as the Pennsylvania 
Price Act32 permits a sale of an absolute interest in property and the 
establishment of a trust in the proceeds. As one proponent of the "wait 
and see" doctrine has put it, "In a sense, the period of the rule as it was 
originally understood has been shortened to zero."33 
It is true, the rule against perpetuities was developed primarily to 
further the alienability of specific land. The early English cases dealing 
with the rule practically all involve contingent legal interests in par-
ticular pieces of real estate. There can be little doubt that sound public 
policy is violated by rendering specific tangible things inalienable. It 
means that property is less productive, and the national income de-
creases. The possessory owner may not wish to make a specific piece 
of property productive because he lacks the capacity for that sort of 
thing, or because he has nothing to invest in its development. Or it may 
be that the existence of a remote future interest means that the posses-
sory owner does not wish to•invest in the development of the property 
because his ownership may terminate on an uncertain event. But he 
cannot sell it to a person who is willing and able to make the property 
productive, because the existence of the future interest makes it un-
marketable. 
If, however, an equitable interest in a trust is involved, the trustee 
is almost certain to have a power to invest and reinvest. Indeed it is his 
duty to make the trust property productive. Hence, the existence of 
remote future interests in trusts does not, as a rule, make property less 
productive or reduce national income. It is believed, however, that 
there are other grounds for restricting the tying up of property in a fund. 
First, it is good public policy to allow each person to dispose of 
his property as he pleases. This policy extends not only to the present 
generation but to future generations. If we are to permit the present 
generation to tie up all existing capital for an indefinitely long period 
of time, then future generations will have nothing to dispose of by 
will except what they have saved from their own income; and the 
property which each generation enjoys will already have been disposed 
of by ancestors long dead. The rule against perpetuities would appear 
to strike a balance between the unlimited disposition of property by 
32 See Pa. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1952) tit. 20, §1561. 
33 Bregy, "A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities," 23 Tl!:MPLE L.Q. 
313 at 323 (1950). Mr. Bregy, however, does not contend that there should be no restric-
tion today on the beneficial interests in private trusts. See his note 21 on the page above 
cited. 
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the members of the present generation and its unlimited disposition 
by members of future generations. 
Second, by prohibiting too remote future interests in trusts, ec-
onomic stagnation is avoided. When we say that a trustee has power 
to invest and reinvest, we do not mean that he can do anything he 
likes with the trust fund. Indeed, his power to dispose of it is extremely 
limited. He cannot give it away; he cannot invest it in new and 
untried enterprises. He· cannot make a speculative investment in 
unimproved real estate. As a trustee, he is pretty much limited to 
investing in :6.rst mortgages and in seasoned stocks and bonds. Yet if 
society is to advance, somebody must take risks by putting capital in 
new enterprises. Somebody must invest in the development of indus-
trial uses of atomic energy. Somebody must put capital into jet pro-
pelled transportation. If all the world's savings are tied up in trusts 
which restrict the use of funds to the conservative pattern set by a 
by-gone era, who will :finance the Columbus of a new industrial age? 
Furthermore, to meet the changing and unforeseeable economic con-
ditions of each generation, there should be some free How of property 
between capital investments and consumers' goods. If all accumulated 
capital is frozen in perpetual private trusts, the demands of any given 
moment cannot release it for consumption. If depression strikes, so 
that beneficiaries of trusts need to invade corpus, or if inflation becomes 
rampant, so that the amount of trust income determined by a dead 
hand becomes inadequate, the beneficiary cannot use the capital of the 
trust. 
Other policies back of the rule, which are applicable to future 
ip.terests in a fund, have been suggested. It is said that the rule 
prevents undue concentration of wealth. On the other hand, it has 
been suggested that, if there is any law of survival of the economic 
:fittest, a restriction on the tying up of trust property is necessary to 
make it work. 
Judicial opinion has always favored the application of the rule 
against perpetuities to beneficial interests in trusts. Indeed, it never 
seems to have been doubted that a power in a trustee to invest and 
reinvest does not take the beneficial interests of the trust out of the 
rule.34 Even when statutes prohibiting the suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation - are involved, the same conclusion has been 
reached,35 though a literal interpretation of such statutes might lead 
to the opposite conclusion. 
34 See 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §370, comment p (1944). 
35 In some states, statutes were enacted expressly providing that the power of a trustee 
to change the form of the subject matter did not prevent the illegal suspension of the power 
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III 
WHAT SHOULD BE DoNE AsouT IT? 
It must be conceded that much of the discussion so far has been 
negative. While I do not approve of the "wait and see' doctrine, I 
recognize that the evils which Professor Leach has so dramatically 
portrayed in his article do exist. Just what should be done about them, 
I am not sure. 
It may be desirable to proceed with legislation of a very specific 
character, to take care of each particular situation which has perennially 
caused trouble---the "unborn widow" case, the "fertile octogenerian" 
case, the administrative contingency. I also approve of Professor 
Leach's suggestion that we provide for a cy pres doctrine, applicable 
to private trusts, which will permit the court to remold them when 
future interests are invalid under the rule. 
If these reforms are thought to be insufficient, and it is felt that 
the common law rule against perpetuities is too deeply encrusted with 
the ashes of a dead feudalism, then I suggest that a new restrictive 
rule be considered with an entirely new approach. What I have to 
say in this regard should in no sense be treated as a proposed solution. 
More study of all its implications should be made before it can be 
determined whether it is a feasible substitute for the rule. I am merely 
suggesting that its possibilities should be investigated before we decide 
to adopt the "wait and see" doctrine. 
The real difficulty which the rule against perpetuities seeks to 
eliminate is the inalienability of present interests, not future interests. 
Vested as well as contingent interests may tie up property. The only 
present interests which are freely marketable are absolute interests in 
land, chattels and intangibles, terms of years in land, and the reversions 
and remainders subject to such terms. Property held in trust, deter-
minable and other qualified fees simple, life estates, as well as all legal 
and equitable estates subject to executory interests, are unmarketable, 
and may be said to be practically inalienable. I would, of course, place 
no limit on the duration of fees simple absolute and terms of years. 
But I would consider prohibiting the creation of a defeasible interest 
or a trust estate which might continue to be such for longer than a fi..xed 
period of time, determined as of the inception of the interest. The 
period might be lives in being and twenty-one years, or if some other 
of alienation. In New York and Michigan this result was reached without the aid of a 
statute. On the other hand, in Minnesota and Wisconsin it was held that the power of 
alienation was not suspended when a power to change the form of the trust res existed. 
As to these cases and statutes, see 4 PROPERTY RI!STATBMBNT 2655 and 2734 (1944). 
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period be thought more desirable, that could be the basis of the rule. 
If an instrument provides for the objectionable kind of limitation, 
neither the present interest nor the future interest following it would 
necessarily be void. As to a determinable fee, fee simple subject to 
a condition subsequent or to an executory interest, the fee simple 
would become absolute, if and when the event named in the special 
limitation, condition or executory limitation had not happened by the 
end of the limiting period, say twenty-one years. As to trusts, they 
would be terminated at the end of the period, if the provisions for their 
termination had not already taken effect. Gifts over would have to be 
rewritten in the light of the earlier termination of possessory interests. 
Rules for this purpose could, no doubt, be developed. And in cases not 
witpin the rules, a sort of cy pres doctrine for private trusts, such as has 
already been referred to, could be employed. 
I realize that to modify the provision for the termination of an 
interest as stated in the terms of the creating instrument is bound to 
cause difficulty. But the problem is much the same as that which has 
been encountered for over a century in applying the English Thel-
lusson Act:36 and its American counterparts. Moreover, legislation has 
already been enacted in some states permitting possibilities of reverter 
and rights of entry for a limited period of time, and invalidating pro-
visions for a longer period of time, only as to the excess.37 
Finally, legislative reform in this area of the law should proceed 
only after thorough study and careful deliberation. There are times 
when it is better to ''bear those ills we have than fly to others that we 
know not of." The path of American legal history is strewed with 
the remains of unsuccessful substitutes for the rule against perpetuities. 
Let us not throw off the restraining yoke of the rule before an adequate 
substitute is found. 
36 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (1800). This was an act which restricted the duration 
of accumulations. As to American counterparts of that act, see 4 PROPERTY R:esTATEMENT 
c. 36 (1944). 
37 As to such statutes, see SxMEs, HANDBOOK oP FUTURB lNrnREsTs 415 (1951); 
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1952 Supp.) §689.18; Rhode Island Acts (1953), House Bill 838, amend-
ing General Laws of Rhode Island (1938), c. 435. 
Addendum: After this article was in page proof, the writer was advised that a bill was 
introduced into the Massachusetts legislature on December 3, 1953, the first section of 
which is as follows: 
"In applying the Rule against Perpetuities to an interest in real or personal property 
limited to take effect after one or more valid life estates, facts existing at the termination 
of such life estate or estates shall be considered in determining the validity of the interest." 
